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schools than do blacks in the city. 
Indeed, within the city, blacks' and 
whites' views of the schools are simi- 
lar, and the same is true in mixed- 
race suburban neighborhoods. Only 
in single-race suburban communities 
do blacks' and whites' evaluations 
differ. 
Understanding the views of blacks 
and whites in mixed-race areas, and 
of black suburbanites generally, is 
especially important in light of the 
changing demographics of major cit- 
ies. The movement of blacks to the 
suburbs and the slowly declining seg- 
regation in major metropolitan areas 
are important urban trends. The im- 
pact of changing residential patterns 
of blacks and whites is not yet ade- 
quately understood, but seems con- 
sequential in several ways. Mixed- 
race neighborhoods promote 
interracial contact, for example, as 
well as lower levels of racial solidar- 
schools than do blacks in the city. 
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are important urban trends. The im- 
pact of changing residential patterns 
of blacks and whites is not yet ade- 
quately understood, but seems con- 
sequential in several ways. Mixed- 
race neighborhoods promote 
interracial contact, for example, as 
well as lower levels of racial solidar- 
ity among blacks; and interracial 
contact in turn, promotes more posi- 
tive attitudes toward members of the 
other race, at least in some contexts. 
Of course, while taking place of 
residence and school performance into 
account reduces racial differences in 
attitudes toward the schools, in the 
Detroit area most whites live where 
the schools are performing at least 
reasonably  well, and most blacks live 
where the schools are not performing 
that well. Thus, four decades after the 
seminal events of the 1950s, racial seg- 
regation in education continues to 
play a crucial role in the disparities  in 
well-being of urban black and white 
populations. 
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overall city MEAP average, since Detroit has 
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Mandatory  school desegregation is 
not usually seen as a success story. 
Most citizens and elected officials 
disfavor it; judges increasingly are 
withdrawing courts from active in- 
volvement in or even oversight of 
racially mixed school districts; inter- 
est groups and educators are focused 
on other means of addressing prob- 
lems of racial inequality in schools. 
Students throughout the United 
States are at least as racially isolated 
now as students were two decades 
ago.' 
Nevertheless, the history of school 
desegregation offers useful lessons. 
To begin with, it can provide object 
lessons about what not to do in seek- 
ing to promulgate and maintain an 
important social reform. But many 
policy initiatives could do that. More 
positively, school desegregation dem- 
onstrates a patterned array of signifi- 
cant successes as well as highly visi- 
ble failures. If we can understand 
where and why school desegregation 
occurs, why it has developed in par- 
ticular directions, and why it has suc- 
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important social reform. But many 
policy initiatives could do that. More 
positively, school desegregation dem- 
onstrates a patterned array of signifi- 
cant successes as well as highly visi- 
ble failures. If we can understand 
where and why school desegregation 
occurs, why it has developed in par- 
ticular directions, and why it has suc- 
ceeded  in some places much more 
than in others, we will have a better 
chance of successfully promoting 
either it or a more popular and ef- 
fective successor. 
The Range of School 
Desegregation Outcomes 
Some  school  districts never de- 
veloped  a plan for desegregation  of 
significant numbers of students. 
Examples  include  New  York  City, 
Hartford,  and Newark.  Others  de- 
veloped,  or had developed  for 
them,  elaborate  plans that never 
went  into  effect  or were  quickly 
rescinded  (Detroit,  Los Angeles, 
Richmond).  Some  developed  sub- 
stantial voluntary plans that af- 
fected  large numbers of  students 
(Yonkers,  Seattle,  Berkeley).  And 
some  had full-scale  mandatory de- 
segregation  programs that affected 
thousands  of students  and faculty 
that persisted  for years  (Boston, 
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portant, array--of  educational and 
social outcomes.  In Milwaukee, for 
example, before the desegregation 
plan was implemented in 1976, there 
was an average of 21% white enroll- 
ment in minority children's schools; 
a decade later, that average had in- 
creased to 31%. In Dayton, the in- 
terracial exposure index rested at 21 
in 1976, the year before desegrega- 
tion, and rose to 37 a decade after 
it. Conversely, in St. Paul, the pro- 
portion of whites in the average mi- 
nority child's school was a high 66% 
the year before desegregation in 
1973, but had fallen to 61% a de- 
cade after desegregation was imple- 
mented (Rossell  1990, 80-94). 
Next, consider the process as well as 
the substance of racial mixing. In 
some districts,  the buses taking chil- 
dren to school in the first year of a 
desegregation program  were escorted 
by mobs hurling epithets and rocks; in 
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other districts  the transition  was tense 
but peaceful. The only systematic 
study of the relationship  between de- 
segregative busing and violence within 
schools found an inverse relation- 
ship-the  more busing, the less vio- 
lence-in  high schools but a positive 
relationship in most types of junior 
high schools (National Institute of 
Education 1978, A18-19).  Cities such 
as Rochester and Charlotte treated 
school desegregation as a matter of 
civic pride and sought to use their suc- 
cess with its implementation as an 
inducement to outsiders to move to 
the area; cities such as Pontiac, Michi- 
gan are known to the outside world 
chiefly for their atrocious handling of 
the desegregative process. 
What happens to children once 
they are in school matters most of 
all. And here too variation is the 
main conclusion. In St. Louis, to cite 
only a recent and unusually careful 
study, black students who transferred 
into predominantly white suburban 
high schools during the early 1990s 
made more significant  academic gains 
(compared with their own starting 
points) than did black students who 
transferred  into specialized and well- 
funded city magnet schools. The 
former group also were more likely to 
graduate from high school than were 
students who remained in the city 
(Lissitz 1994; Clough and Uchitelle 
1995, 38). Across a sample of eight 
magnet school programs,  "higher  fi- 
nancial investments...  were associated 
with higher levels of integration and 
educational quality"  (Blank 1983, 
136-40). 
Even public opinion is more var- 
ied on the issue of school desegrega- 
tion than it is commonly thought to 
be. All surveys show that a huge ma- 
jority of Americans favor the con- 
cept of school desegregation. Two- 
thirds agree more concretely that 
integration has "improved the qual- 
ity of education for blacks" and two- 
fifths say the same about the quality 
of education for whites. Recently, 
over half of whites and over 80% of 
blacks agreed that desegregative ef- 
forts should be intensified (Edmonds 
1994). More concretely still, an an- 
nual national survey of first-year col- 
lege students-who,  after all, have 
direct experience with school deseg- 
regation-shows  steady and unvary- 
ing increases in support. Between 
1976 and 1992 (the first and last 
years that the question was asked), 
the proportion of freshmen who 
agreed that "busing is OK if it helps 
to achieve racial balance in the 
schools" rose from 37% to 55% (Co- 
operative Institutional Research Pro- 
gram 1991, 121-25; 1992, 26). 
As the student survey suggests, the 
framing of a question on a contro- 
versial topic makes a considerable 
difference in proffered opinions on 
surveys. When presented with the 
simple option of agreeing that 
"forced busing" is undesirable, most 
adult Americans (of all races) take 
it. But more nuanced questions 
evoke more ambivalent views. In 
July 1996, for example, 43% of white 
and 66% of black residents of Con- 
necticut favored the state Supreme 
Court's recent ruling that "it was up to 
the governor and legislature to come 
up with a plan to improve this [racial] 
balance" between Hartford and sur- 
rounding suburbs.  Half of the respon- 
dents agreed that "more should be 
done to integrate schools throughout 
the state of Connecticut";  three-fifths 
agreed that racial imbalance is a seri- 
ous problem; and three-fifths agreed 
that political officials  should "do their 
best to improve racial integration even 
if that means doing more than the 
Court requires,"  rather than "try[ing] 
to figure out the smallest change the 
court will accept" (Frahm 1996a, Al). 
The dreaded words "forced busing" 
did not appear in any of these ques- 
tions, so this support may evaporate.2 
But it is not a bad platform from 
which to start pursuing desegregative 
reforms. 
Even the experience of desegrega- 
tion-related busing does not neces- 
sarily produce revulsion. In 1978 and 
again in 1989, about three-fifths of 
both white and black parents whose 
children had been bused for desegre- 
gative purposes reported that the 
experience had been "very satisfac- 
tory" (Harris and Associates  1978, 
38; 1989, 116, 210). There is a prob- 
lem of self-selection here, of course; 
some of the people most opposed to 
busing presumably withdrew their 
children from the public school sys- 
tem and thus were not among poten- 
tial respondents to these questions. 
Nevertheless, it is probably safe to 
say that none of the white and few 
of the black respondents would have 
chosen before the fact to have their 
child bused, so the finding that al- 
most two-thirds of them were "very" 
pleased with the experience is a 
powerful indicator that experience 
can change preferences. 
I could continue-outcomes  vary 
in such arenas as levels of interracial 
friendship, community involvement 
with schools, housing and job conse- 
quences for desegregated students, 
pedagogical innovations, desegrega- 
tion of faculty and administrators, 
and so on. But my purpose here is 
more analytic than descriptive, so let 
us turn to lessons that we can draw 
from our nation's experience with 
school desegregation. 
Explaining the Variation in 
Amounts of 
School Desegregation 
First and most crucially, there 
would have been no school desegre- 
gation absent authoritative imposi- 
tion from an agent outside and 
"above" the school districts them- 
selves.3 This point begins with Brown 
v. Board of Education in 1954 and 
continues through the famous Su- 
preme Court cases of the succeeding 
two decades-Green  v. New Kent 
County (1968), Alexander v. Holmes 
County (1969), Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenberg  (1971), and Keyes v. 
Denver (1973). It continues further 
with a recognition that what the Su- 
preme Court gives, the Supreme 
Court takes away; more recent deci- 
sions such as Milliken v. Bradley 
(1974)4, Oklahoma v. Dowell (1991)5, 
and Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)6 have 
done almost as much to slow or halt 
the process of mandatory school de- 
segregation as the string of earlier 
decisions did to strengthen it. 
The point can also be made by 
starting from the other direction, 
with a list of school districts and the 
agents responsible for their initiation 
of desegregation. Most of the largest 
districts, or the districts that contain 
the largest numbers of African 
American children, were desegre- 
gated by court order if at all. A few 
were desegregated by pressure or 
requirements from their state board 
of education, and another few were 
desegregated by orders from what 
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was then the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. 
Local school boards did institute 
desegregation plans in a few cities; 
do they offer an alternative model to 
the claim just made? One set of 
such districts include Berkeley, Aus- 
tin (Texas), and Princeton-which 
constitutes a large share of the lib- 
eral, wealthy, small, predominantly 
white, highly-educated university 
towns that are relatively responsive 
to demands for racial equity. An- 
other group of such districts offers 
more promise  for a claim that au- 
thoritative  imposition  is not neces- 
sary; Portland  (Oregon),  Tacoma 
(Washington),  Racine  (Wisconsin), 
and Rochester  (New  York)  all de- 
segregated  as a consequence  of 
school  board initiatives.  These  dis- 
tricts are similar to university 
towns in that they are relatively 
small, wealthy,  and predominantly 
white,  but at least  they resemble 
other  cities  more  than do Prince- 
ton or Berkeley.  So perhaps  there 
is an important  caveat  to my claim 
of the  need  for authoritative  impo- 
sition. 
But this caveat loses much of its 
force on closer inspection. Most cit- 
ies that chose to desegregate absent 
a court order in fact chose to deseg- 
regate before a court order; they 
were either directly threatened with 
a law suit (or administrative order) 
or they anticipated that a suit might 
soon be forthcoming. Without such a 
threat or anticipation, the impetus to 
desegregate  seldom developed, was 
dissolved, or was bowled over by the 
opposition. For example, in 1976, 
the school board of Yonkers re- 
sponded to pressure from the state 
Commissioner of Education and 
rumblings from the local NAACP 
chapter by hiring a new superinten- 
dent with desegregative experience. 
He promptly set up a community 
task force to design a plan, and for- 
mulated his own program for needed 
school closings partly on the basis of 
their desegregative impact. Within a 
year, however, Commissioner Ewald 
Nyquist had been fired by an in- 
creasingly anti-busing Board of Re- 
gents, the mayor of Yonkers contin- 
ued to replace activist liberals on the 
local school board with strong con- 
servatives, and local groups were 
pointing out that the pressure for 
desegregation had been removed. 
(As the Taxpayers of Northeast 
Yonkers put it in a public memo to 
its members, "It is clear that busing 
for integration purposes is out of 
favor even at the state level, and 
that there is very little likelihood 
A segregated primary school, southeastern Missouri, 1938.  Courtesy of the Library of Congress 
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that the [new] commissioner would 
mandate a forced busing program on 
the city of Yonkers....  [We] there- 
fore again recommend...  that the 
Board of Education reject [Superin- 
tendent] Robitaille's plan without 
being intimidate[d] by fear of federal 
or state agency sanctions [TONEY 
1978]")7  The Task Force completed 
its report to no effect, the board 
closed a few schools with no atten- 
tion to desegregative impact, and the 
superintendent resigned.8 
In a similar dynamic, the Duval 
The absence of a threat 
from an external  authority 
makes desegregative  action 
almost impossible. 
County, Florida School Board is cur- 
rently negotiating with the local 
NAACP over a desegregation plan. 
The Board is willing to search for a 
settlement because "if...  [it] loses 
[in impending litigation over being 
declared a unitary district] in court, 
such an agreement would be in place 
and could help dissuade a federal 
judge from imposing a more strin- 
gent desegregation plan" (Saunders 
1996, B1). 
The same point can be put nega- 
tively: the absence of a threat from 
an external authority makes desegre- 
gative action almost impossible. In 
1987, for example, the state Com- 
missioner of Education in Connecti- 
cut issued an "impassioned report" 
calling school segregation "'educa- 
tionally, morally, and legally 
wrong.'" He called for "collective 
responsibility" in planning a remedy, 
but also suggested that the state 
Board of Education "be empowered 
to impose a mandatory desegrega- 
tion plan" should the voluntary plan- 
ning process fail. In the words of his 
later testimony, "all hell broke 
loose." One state legislator called for 
his resignation; another described 
him as "despicable"; the governor 
abjured mandatory solutions; and 
Commissioner Tirozzi's report of the 
following year never mentioned the 
word "desegregation" (Traub 1994).9 
No school district except Hartford 
(with about 90% students of color) 
responded favorably to his call. 
Most elected officials, not surpris- 
ingly, are exquisitely careful to avoid 
such a situation. In July 1996, only 
four days after the Connecticut Su- 
preme Court ordered desegregation 
of the state's schools, the governor 
ruled out mandatory transportation: 
"The Supreme Court did not say 
they wanted forced busing, and we 
know that forced busing is not an 
alternative. It's not acceptable to the 
legislature, it's not acceptable to the 
people." Asked for an alternative 
proposal, he responded, "We have 
got to be creative and thoughtful 
and compassionate in figuring out 
other ways to try to resolve the is- 
sue...  Just because the solution is 
not before us at this very moment, 
doesn't mean it doesn't exist....  But 
I thought it was important to put a 
line in the sand and say we're not 
going to do forced busing because 
that's the issue that will ignite the 
emotions" (Frahm 1996). 
In short, if there is to be any 
school desegregation beyond mini- 
mal tokenism, it almost certainly will 
be imposed by an authority more 
insulated from constituency pres- 
sures or campaign temptations than 
any elected  official can be. That au- 
thority is usually, but need not be, a 
court. A few exceptions exist to this 
generalization, but they are either 
less exceptional than they initially 
appear to be or they are unlikely to 
be replicable elsewhere. Despite 
their abstract support for school de- 
segregation, most white members of 
the American public simply do not 
want very many black (and dispro- 
portionately poor) children in the 
same classroom as their own chil- 
dren, and they will do what they can 
to keep them out. Most black mem- 
bers of the American public either 
return the compliment, or have 
abandoned the desegregative effort 
in disgust. 
Explaining the Variation in 
Consequences of 
School Desegregation 
It is harder to explain the array of 
outcomes of school desegregation 
Despite their abstract 
support  for school 
desegregation,  most white 
members of the American 
public simply do not want 
very  many black (and 
disproportionately  poor) 
children in the same 
classroom as their own 
children, and they will do 
what they can to keep them 
out. Most black members 
of the American public 
either return  the 
compliment, or have 
abandoned the 
desegregative  effort  in 
disgust. 
policy than to explain when and why 
such a policy is put into effect. I see 
three components as essential for a 
school desegregation plan to suc- 
ceed:10 moral and organizational 
leadership, a broad mix of incentives 
and requirements, and contextual 
luck and the skill to take advantage 
of it. 
Leadership: Ideally, leadership will 
come from those elected or ap- 
pointed to lead-school  boards and 
superintendents, mayors and city 
councils, governors and legislators- 
although it may emerge from local 
notables or interest group leaders if 
public officials leave a vacuum. Re- 
gardless of where they come from, 
however, leaders must accomplish 
several tasks. They need not pro- 
mote school desegregation; the pre- 
vious section has shown that deseg- 
regation would almost never succeed 
if that were necessary. But once de- 
segregation is thrust upon them, 
leaders do need to make the effort 
to turn necessity into opportunity. 
Leaders can turn necessity into 
opportunity by using school desegre- 
gation as the excuse or lever for 
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making other desirable changes in 
the school system. This will have the 
effect both of focusing attention on 
the school system as a whole rather 
than on racial tensions per se, and, if 
it is well done, of actually enabling 
the school system to improve at the 
same time that it is desegregating. A 
member of the West Hartford Board 
of Education opined that 
the Sheff  v. O'Neill  challenge  [the 
Connecticut  Supreme  Court  desegre- 
gation  mandate  of July 1996]  is a 
magnificent  opportunity  to design  ed- 
ucation  for the 21st century....  Solv- 
ing the issue of local integration  must 
be a side effect,  but not the sole ob- 
jective of the [planning]  panel.  As 
critical  a question  is how  the current 
systems  are also segregating  all students 
from  participation  in the global  econ- 
omy  of the new  century  (Sloane  1996). 
Even an entrepreneurial County Ex- 
ecutive sees the possibility of making 
financial lemonade out of the deseg- 
regative lemon: "Curry  is amenable 
to the school board's request that 
the court order the county and state 
to pay for the [newly proposed de- 
segregation] plan....  Perhaps a 
court order would force other 
elected  officials and residents in 
Prince George's [County] to address 
what Curry said is an antiquated and 
deficient tax structure. 'I think [the 
desegregation issue] certainly has 
tremendous implications for our cur- 
rent tax structure'" (Montgomery 
and Neal  1996). 
Attaching the issue of desegrega- 
tion to other school reforms raises 
obvious and serious risks. Those re- 
forms themselves may generate op- 
position (as in Yonkers, where many 
parents vehemently opposed the 
school closings); they may take over 
all of the attention of school officials 
(as threatens to occur in the Hart- 
ford case, judging from the editorial 
quoted above); their failure may de- 
rail the progress of desegregation (as 
seems likely in Prince George's 
County). Nevertheless, the best evi- 
dence on thirty years of experimen- 
tation with school reform shows 
clearly that it is almost impossible to 
fix any of the parts without fixing the 
whole. School systems are tightly 
intertwined, highly complex organi- 
zations; merely moving the students 
or changing the funding formulas or 
decentralizing or reforming the cur- 
riculum-or  any other magic bul- 
let-runs  up against the inertia and 
multiplicity of such a system (Hochs- 
child 1984; Scovronick 1996; Trimble 
and Forsaith 1995; Payne 1997; Con- 
sortium for Policy Research in Edu- 
cation 1997). An educational leader 
who is serious about successful de- 
segregation must seek to reform 
other features of his or her system 
simultaneously; conversely, an edu- 
cational leader who seeks systemic 
reform may find court-ordered de- 
segregation to be his or her best le- 
ver for achieving it. 
An effective leader should do at 
least three other things in order to 
desegregate successfully. He or she 
needs to involve the community as 
much as possible while not permit- 
ting the parents with the most politi- 
cal resources (typically those who 
are white, affluent, well-educated, 
and/or ideologically motivated) to 
dominate the process. My book of 
over a decade ago shows what can 
go wrong with community participa- 
tion (Hochschild  1984); here I want 
to emphasize what can go right. In 
Rochester, "community groups and 
community pride were the over- 
whelming positive forces in enabling 
desegregation to be effected. The 
riots in 1964-65  upset many com- 
munity members who felt that they 
placed the city in a poor light. Posi- 
tive action needed  to be taken to 
remove the blot on the city's image. 
Wide opportunities for public discus- 
sion allowed parents and other 
members of the community to feel 
they could influence the decisions 
being made." A racially-mixed  and 
middle-class Community  Association, 
the United Federation of Inner City 
Parents, the Spanish Action Coalition, 
and the Apartment Owners Associa- 
tion were among the community 
groups that participated  in designing 
the Rochester plan. In Dayton, 
providing  opportunities  for commu- 
nity involvement  in the implementa- 
tion of the various  desegregation 
plans  received  at least as much  atten- 
tion as the creation  of the plans 
themselves.  The literature  prepared 
by the Superintendent's  office  empha- 
sized the importance  of community 
input.  Advisory  boards,  which  met 
every  Saturday,  were created  that in- 
cluded  business  and religious  leaders, 
social agencies  and the police, parents 
and other grass  roots groups.  The 
murder  of court  monitor  Charles 
Glatt,  by an irate white citizen op- 
posed to desegregation,  shocked  the 
community  and served  as a compel- 
ling impetus  for people to work  to- 
gether....  The community  groups 
and community  participation  in gen- 
eral was extremely  important  in im- 
plementing  the desegregation  efforts 
(Stave 1995). 
These  are not ideal models; if a riot 
or murder is needed  to bring a com- 
munity together to plan for an un- 
desired but inevitable change in so- 
cial policy, community participation 
is hardly an unalloyed good. Never- 
theless, school desegregation man- 
dates are much more likely to suc- 
ceed if they are taken up by leaders 
who impel the community toward a 
sense of responsibility for the collec- 
tive outcome. 
Effective leadership is, thirdly, 
moral. Educators (and hopefully 
elected officials) need to emphasize 
the desirability for all races of end- 
ing racial isolation, the importance 
of education for the whole commu- 
nity, the role of public schools as a 
unifying and edifying institution, and 
the virtues of innovation. These  ar- 
guments need to be made repeat- 
edly, forcefully, eloquently, and per- 
suasively-and  they need to be 
backed up by the other actions de- 
scribed herein. This requirement is 
as easy to describe as it is hard to 
do. But the evidence from arenas 
ranging from the abolition of sexual 
harassment in corporations to the 
willingness of agency officials to con- 
vey bad news to their chiefs is clear. 
Leaders can set the tone of their 
organization's behavior by (1) issuing 
clear statements of expectations, 
backed by (2) clear channels for re- 
ward and punishment based on 
those expectations, and (3) ensuring 
widespread publication of those re- 
wards or punishments and the rea- 
sons thereof. Employees  are usually 
willing to comply with actions that 
both are fair by the stated criteria, 
and are seen to be fair, even if the 
criteria themselves are not ones the 
employees would have chosen. 
That sentence  suggests the fourth 
requirement of leadership; leaders 
must be prepared to amass the 
power to enforce unpopular orders 
and then to issue those orders if 
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necessary. Here is another way in 
which a judicial or administrative 
order provides some of the ammuni- 
tion to do what it requires; if a 
school superintendent can persua- 
sively argue that the court will issue 
an even more unpalatable order if 
the current one  is not obeyed, he or 
she has considerable leverage to add 
to the power inherent in the position 
of superintendent. 
Incentives and Requirements: 
Moral, forceful, imaginative, and 
sensitive leadership is necessary but 
not sufficient to achieve success in a 
social policy as fraught with political 
and substantive difficulties as school 
desegregation. Good policies are 
equally essential. Good policies, we 
have discovered after thirty years of 
experimentation with school desegre- 
gation, are at base an effective mix 
of incentives and costs. The plan 
needs incentives in order not to lose 
reluctant or fearful participants who 
have other options. It also needs to 
impose costs on those same partici- 
pants because in order to succeed, 
school desegregation must redistrib- 
ute at least some money, power, sta- 
tus, and comfort beyond what people 
will voluntarily redistribute. 
To assert that school desegrega- 
tion needs the right combination of 
incentives and costs in order to suc- 
ceed remains merely a cliche until it 
is given precise content. Unfortu- 
nately, that is very difficult to do in 
the abstract; particular districts have 
different geographic, demographic, 
economic,  political, and character- 
ological configurations that must be 
taken into account in designing a 
plan. A few general findings, how- 
ever, can at least point us in the 
right direction. 
First, few whites, and increasingly 
fewer blacks, will tolerate transfers 
of students merely in order to bal- 
ance the races in schools or class- 
rooms. The reasons are various, in- 
cluding but not limited to racial 
hostility. Regardless of preferences, 
however, racial balance is a neces- 
sary first step in successful school 
desegregation, so a way must be 
found to attain more of it. Several 
educational techniques are relatively 
effective in persuading parents to 
send their children to a public 
school other than the one they 
would initially prefer (usually but 
not always a neighborhood school). 
Those techniques include (1) sub- 
ject-specific magnet schools for mid- 
dle and high schools and pedagogi- 
cally distinct magnet schools for the 
elementary grades; (2) district- 
wide-or  better, interdistrict- 
choice among a variety of schools 
coupled with extensive and sophisti- 
cated dissemination of information; 
(3) physical renovation of schools 
and the addition of special equip- 
ment such as computer or science 
labs; (4) dramatically lowering the 
student/teacher ratio; (5) safe and 
convenient transportation, a safe 
school, and a safe environment 
around the school; (6) connecting 
the school with a prestigious external 
organization such as a university or 
corporate employer; and (7) enhanc- 
ing the quality and quantity of extra- 
curricular activities and "specials" 
such as art and music instruction 
during regular school hours. Other 
techniques could be added to the 
list, but all have the same basic char- 
acteristic-they  offset the "cost" of 
sending one's child to a school with 
a nonpreferred racial balance with 
incentives designed to improve the 
educational outcomes  and daily en- 
joyment of public schooling. (Note 
that these techniques are not in 
Kindergarten class, 1949, of Linda Brown (back row, fourth from the right), daughter of plantiff in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, 1954. Courtesy of the Topeka Capital-Journal,  Topeka, Kansas. 
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most cases alternatives; many are, in 
fact, interactive, such that combina- 
tions of reforms will have much 
more impact than one or two iso- 
lated reforms. This is, of course, an- 
other way of making the point that 
desegregation is most effective when 
combined with systemic school re- 
form.) 
Another strategy for creating in- 
centives to balance the presumed 
costs of desegregation focuses less 
on the content of schooling and 
more on changing the organizational 
and governance structure of the 
schools. The key idea here is con- 
trol, coupled with choice. If parents 
perceive that they have some control 
over which school their child attends 
and what happens within the school, 
they become  more willing to partici- 
pate in a desegregation plan. Thus, 
in Rochester, "once the magnet con- 
cept was made the cornerstone of 
the desegregation efforts, parents felt 
they had choice and control over the 
destinies of their children and sup- 
port for the desegregation concept 
grew." Similarly in Dayton, "parents' 
feeling they had some control over 
the destiny of their children was the 
most important factor in enabling 
desegregation to take place" (Stave 
1995, 41, 21). Dayton now combines 
magnet schools with an increasing 
emphasis on site-based management 
and decentralized administration. 
Looking across a variety of school 
districts, most researchers now claim 
that controlled choice plans produce 
more racial balance than does man- 
datory reassignment (Rossell  1990; 
Armor 1995), or even that purely 
voluntary plans produce more racial 
balance than controlled choice plans 
(Rossell  1995, 43-76; but see Or- 
field, Eaton, et al. 1996). Others 
have demonstrated that decentraliza- 
tion of curriculum, budgetary, and 
personnel decisions to the parents 
and staff of individual schools can in 
some cases improve the quality of 
education and the willingness of par- 
ents to send their children to a pre- 
viously disfavored school (Bryk et al. 
1993). 
Contextual Constraints  and Possi- 
bilities: A final rule for successful 
school desegregation is: be aware of 
constraints and possibilities given by 
context. There is even less generaliz- 
able policy wisdom here than with 
If parents perceive that they 
have some control over 
which school their child 
attends and what happens 
within the school, they 
become more willing to 
participate in a 
desegregation  plan. 
the second rule (about costs and in- 
centives), since context is by defini- 
tion idiosyncratic to specific places. 
So here I must rest content with the 
simple point that policy-makers must 
be sensitive to context without allow- 
ing it to stifle innovation. 
Some contexts are especially diffi- 
cult to negotiate from the perspec- 
tive of implementing school desegre- 
gation. Examples include a state 
comprised of many small districts 
with a fierce sense of local autonomy 
(New Jersey), districts that are ex- 
tremely large physically (Los Ange- 
les) or in population (New York 
City), districts with terrain that 
makes movement difficult (Los An- 
geles, Yonkers), districts with a his- 
tory of robust racial or ethnic antag- 
onism (Boston, Chicago), and 
districts with a history of corruption 
and malfeasance in school board 
members and administrators (New 
York City, Newark). These  are the 
places where school desegregation 
has not occurred or where its imple- 
mentation has ranged from ineffec- 
tive to disastrous. 
But other  contexts  provide  an 
opportunity  for policy  innovation. 
They include  communities  with an 
unusually liberal population 
(Princeton,  Berkeley,  Madison, 
WI),  communities  whose  self-image 
importantly depends  on the  ab- 
sence  of racial hostility  (Rochester, 
Atlanta),  districts that encompass 
suburbs and rural areas as well  as 
city (most  southern  districts and 
Hawaii),  and districts with a rela- 
tively small black population 
and/or a relatively  affluent popula- 
tion  of other  non-Anglos  (Seattle, 
Tacoma).  These  are the places 
where  school  desegregation  has 
been  on balance  peaceful,  volun- 
tary, persistent,  and successful. 
We hear much more about the 
disasters than about the successes. 
The former make better news sto- 
ries, they involve more people  on 
any one occasion, and they typically 
occur near or in media centers. But 
over many years and across the full 
expanse of the nation, there are ar- 
guably more people  in potentially 
favorable than in probably hostile 
contexts. Policy makers need to be 
alert for circumstances that will en- 
courage desegregation, and need 
equally to be prepared to do what 
they can to offset the circumstances 
that will discourage it. 
These four lessons about how to 
desegregate successfully are difficult 
to articulate, and even more difficult 
to implement-no  wonder school 
desegregation can hardly be de- 
scribed as a stunning success. So why 
bother? 
Conclusion: School 
Desegregation Is the Worst 
Option, Except for the Others 
Winston Churchill described de- 
mocracy as the worst system of gov- 
ernance except for all of the others. 
School desegregation is similar: few 
people want it, most districts do it 
poorly-but,  when coupled with 
deep systemic reform of educational 
governance and content, it is our 
only available option for ending the 
racial isolation and (possibly increas- 
ing) racial antagonism that separates 
cities and suburbs. Racial separatism 
is neither, in my view, a viable op- 
tion for most African Americans nor 
an attractive one for most whites. At 
best, it is unstable and personally 
constricting; at worst, it is a recipe 
for increased tension, hatred, and 
eventual violence. Nor will racial 
integration develop on its own at a 
pace faster than all deliberate speed. 
We cannot afford to wait for the in- 
finitesmally slow process of residen- 
tial desegregation or racial intermar- 
riage to dissolve black-white 
hostilities. Racial integration in the 
workplace is reasonably effective, but 
it requires that young adults be suffi- 
ciently well-educated to be able to 
get a job in the first place. 
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And that leads to my final argu- 
ment for school desegregation. We 
cannot afford to allow urban school 
systems to continue to deteriorate. 
There are 1,500 fourth graders in 
Hartford who attend schools where 
fewer than 1% of the children meet 
the state math and reading goals for 
their grade level. Putting them on a 
bus to Guilford will not by itself 
There  are 1,500 fourth 
graders in Hartford who 
attend schools where  fewer 
than 1% of the children 
meet the state math and 
reading  goals for their 
grade level. 
teach them how to read, but nei- 
ther-demonstrably-will  leaving 
them where they are. Ensuring that 
they attend a school where other 
children can read and add is, accord- 
ing to the scattered but consistent 
evidence, their best chance to be- 
come literate adults. Conversely, 
putting some of Guilford's children 
on a bus into Hartford-assuming 
that they would go-would  perhaps 
galvanize the Hartford school district 
and state of Connecticut into taking 
the painful and expensive steps 
needed  to blow up this nonfunc- 
tional system. Perhaps no individuals 
are at fault, and certainly many indi- 
viduals make heroic efforts to teach 
children in inner city schools, but for 
whatever complicated set of reasons 
the results are simply unacceptable. 
In that context, even a little success 
in desegregating schools is worth 
pursuing. 
Notes 
1.  In 1972-73, 64% of black children and 
57% of Latino children attended predomi- 
nantly minority schools; in 1994-95,  the fig- 
ures had increased to 67% and 74%, respec- 
tively (Orfield, Bachmeier, James, and Eitle 
1997, 11). 
2.  In a series of focus groups about the 
Court ruling, "few parents, students, or educa- 
tors believed that racial isolation was the 
main contributor to the poor performance of 
Hartford students. All the groups...  felt that 
the primary focus should be on improving the 
educational system in the Hartford school sys- 
tem rather than focusing on objectives such as 
busing or redistricting." (Darryl McMiller, 
message to Race-Politics Listserv, 13 Novem- 
ber 1996.) Perhaps the main lesson here is 
that people will respond very differently de- 
pending on what alternatives are offered to 
them. If the choice is real compliance versus 
superficial pretense, they opt for the former; 
if the choice is desegregation or the possibility 
of some other (unspecified?) reform that will 
improve children's achievement, they opt for 
the latter. It is also possible that focus groups 
elicit different views from surveys, but I see 
no reason at present to believe that one form 
of response is necessarily more trustworthy 
than the other. 
3.  I developed this argument in (1984, 
chap. 5). 
4.  Which made it almost impossible to 
impose mandatory interdistrict remedies. 
5.  Which held that once a district met the 
requirements of good faith compliance and 
elimination of vestiges of segregation, it could 
be declared unitary. In that case, it was re- 
leased from its obligation to maintain a man- 
datory busing plan and racial balance plan. 
6.  Which ruled that financial equalization 
remedies that substituted for physical desegre- 
gation could be limited in time and extent, 
and that school districts need not improve 
educational outcomes in order to be declared 
unitary on other grounds. 
7.  Taxpayers Organization of North East 
Yonkers Education Committee,  TONEY Re- 
port on School Reorganization  Phase #2 
(Printed in the Herald Statesman), 5 March 
1978: 1-id.  The Lincoln Park Taxpayers is- 
sued a similar memo in 1997 (Lincoln Park 
Taxpayers Association Education Committee, 
Report (Unpublished manuscript, 1977). 
8.  Two years later, the NAACP  and U.S. 
Justice Department took the Yonkers Board 
of Education to court in a desegregation suit. 
The Yonkers School District was found guilty 
of de jure segregation in 1985. 
9.  Five years later, in the face of a lawsuit 
demanding mandatory desegregation of Hart- 
ford and the surrounding suburbs, the Con- 
necticut legislature set up eleven regional 
planning groups across the state to propose 
means to voluntarily desegregate the schools. 
(The enabling legislation, however, neither 
included numerical goals nor mentioned the 
word "desegregation.") After six months of 
deliberation, "every region endorsed using 
interactive video among schools" and a few 
proposed new magnet schools-five  in all, for 
a state with 508,000 public school students, 
and even then only if new state funds were 
forthcoming to pay for them. After all, as the 
chair of Glastonbury's Town Council pointed 
out, "towns are willing to put up a certain 
amount, but we still have our taxpayers to 
account to, and our kids" (Judson 1994). 
10.  I define success in school desegregation 
broadly and eclectically. It includes interracial 
exposure, the maintenance of academic 
achievement for the highest-achieving stu- 
dents and gains in achievement for the lowest- 
achieving students, a level of social comfort 
that involves routine interactions if not close 
friendships across the races, a racially mixed 
teaching and administrative staff, and good 
school morale. Many other features are 
equally desirable, and may be necessary to 
achieve those just listed. They include broad 
parental participation in the schools, main- 
streaming special education students as much 
as possible, ensuring the needed  social and 
health services for students, enabling success- 
ful transitions into employment or higher edu- 
cation, and fostering a multicultural curricu- 
lum and experiential pedagogical techniques. 
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Fifty  years ago, the cross was taken 
up again on behalf of racial equality. 
Success may seem to have been as- 
sured, but only in retrospect. Initi- 
ated by Southern blacks, reinforced 
by volunteer whites from the North, 
and transformed by the charismatic 
leadership of Martin Luther King 
Jr., the civil rights movement put an 
end to state-mandated segregation, 
an historic accomplishment ratified 
into law in the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
The achievement of equality un- 
der the law was a monumental vic- 
tory. But legal equality did not, as 
the passing years have made plain, 
automatically translate into eco- 
nomic or social equality. Of course, 
there have been gains. For one, the 
black middle class has at least tri- 
pled in size, not a small advance by 
the standards of actual rather than 
ideal societies. Yet, for all their 
progress, blacks remain poorer and 
die younger, to mention only two of 
the persisting expressions of racial 
inequality. Notwithstanding the his- 
toric injustices that black Americans 
have suffered, large numbers of 
white Americans remain opposed to 
a wide  array of public policies, 
from social welfare  through affir- 
mative action,  aimed  at finally 
Fifty  years ago, the cross was taken 
up again on behalf of racial equality. 
Success may seem to have been as- 
sured, but only in retrospect. Initi- 
ated by Southern blacks, reinforced 
by volunteer whites from the North, 
and transformed by the charismatic 
leadership of Martin Luther King 
Jr., the civil rights movement put an 
end to state-mandated segregation, 
an historic accomplishment ratified 
into law in the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
The achievement of equality un- 
der the law was a monumental vic- 
tory. But legal equality did not, as 
the passing years have made plain, 
automatically translate into eco- 
nomic or social equality. Of course, 
there have been gains. For one, the 
black middle class has at least tri- 
pled in size, not a small advance by 
the standards of actual rather than 
ideal societies. Yet, for all their 
progress, blacks remain poorer and 
die younger, to mention only two of 
the persisting expressions of racial 
inequality. Notwithstanding the his- 
toric injustices that black Americans 
have suffered, large numbers of 
white Americans remain opposed to 
a wide  array of public policies, 
from social welfare  through affir- 
mative action,  aimed  at finally 
achieving  racial equality.  Indeed,  it 
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